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This paper examines government policies aimed at rescuing banks from the effects of the great 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. To delimit the scope of the analysis, we concentrate on the fiscal side of 
interventions and ignore, by design, the monetary policy reaction to the crisis. The policy response to 
the subprime crisis started in earnest after Lehman’s failure in mid September 2008, accelerated after 
February 2009, and has become very large by September 2009. Governments have relied on a portfolio 
of intervention tools, but the biggest commitments and outlays have been in the form of debt and asset 
guarantees, while purchases of bad assets have been very limited. We employ event study 
methodology to estimate the benefits of government interventions on banks and their shareholders.  
Announcements directed at the banking system as a whole (general) and at specific banks (specific) 
were priced by the markets as cumulative abnormal rates of return over the selected window periods. 
General announcements tend to be associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns and specific 
announcements with negative ones. General announcements exert cross-area spillovers but are 
perceived by the home-country banks as subsidies boosting the competitive advantage of foreign 
banks. Specific announcements exert spillovers on other banks. Our results are also sensitive to the 
information environment. Specific announcements tend to exert a positive impact on rates of return in 
the pre-crisis sub-period, when announcements are few and markets have relative confidence in the 
“normal” information flow. The opposite takes place in the turbulent crisis sub-period when 
announcements are the order of the day and markets mistrust the “normal” information flow. These 
results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of individual institutions to come forth with 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines government policies aimed at rescuing banks from the effects of the great 
financial crisis of 2007-2009. To delimit the scope of the analysis, we will concentrate on the fiscal 
side of interventions and will ignore, by design, the monetary policy reaction to the crisis (in essence, 
we will ignore inflation as a possible crisis exit). The paper is organized in three parts. The first 
(Section II) gives a description of the subprime crisis that fits many aspects of a credit-boom-and-
bust-cycle (CBB, for short) hypothesis. Crises, on the other hand, have idiosyncratic features. The 
distinctive characteristic of this crisis has been the creation of complex and opaque assets and the 
transfer of these assets from the balance sheet of banks to the markets. The subprime crisis, as is well 
known by now, has been big in terms of geographical coverage, number of failed and rescued banks, 
and real sector spillovers. Over a 19-month period starting at the end of July of 2007, a representative 
sample of 120 large banks from the United States, Western Europe and the Pacific region lost $3.23 
trillion of market capitalization. The depth of the crisis cannot be explained only by deteriorating 
fundamentals; as predicted by the CBB hypothesis, the bust that followed the boom led to a sharply 
rising risk aversion of the investing public. 
  The second part (Section III) reviews the long list of government announcements to rescue the 
banking system after the failure of Lehman Brothers in mid September 2008. We provide quantitative 
summaries of both commitments and actual disbursements using alternative sources.
1 The data 
available suggest that governments have employed a mixture of bank asset and debt guarantees, 
equity funding, and purchases of poor-quality assets. Opaque but politically attractive guarantees 
have the dominant weight in this portfolio. 
                                                      
1 This is work in progress because, at the time of writing (September 2009), governments are far from finished with their 
rescue interventions. 3 
 
  The third part (Section IV) employs event study methodology to estimate the benefits of 
government interventions on banks and their shareholders. The hypothesis is that the announcement 
of a rescue plan is credible if it affects rates of return of the targeted banks. We test for these effects 
by computing cumulative abnormal returns of the participating banks around a window that includes 
announcement dates. Government announcements of rescue plans are either aimed at the entire 
banking system or at specific banks. We perform three separate tests on our sample of large banks. 
One test estimates, with panel data, the overall impact on banks’ equity valuation of the two types of 
government rescue announcements; another estimates cross-area spillover effects of the first 
announcement type; and a third one estimates cross-bank spillover effects of the second 
announcement type. Our findings suggest that announcements have exerted a statistically significant 
and economically relevant impact on banks’ equity valuation over the announcement window. We 
draw conclusions about our study in Section V.  
 
II.  THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AS A CREDIT BOOM AND BUST CYCLE  
There is a long tradition in economics of associating financial crises with credit booms and busts 
that give rise to booms and busts in banking and securities markets; see, among others, Mitchell 
(1913), Fisher (1933), Minsky (1977), and Kindleberger (1978). A crisis starts with a macro shock 
or displacement that alters the profit outlook in the economy. To this follows an expansion of bank 
credit that feeds the economic boom. Firms expand debt relative to equities to finance new projects 
based on optimistic assessments of future profits. Optimism about the future drives the process of 
capital and debt accumulation. Monetary expansion comes with or promotes the expansion of bank 
credit. Prices of specific assets increase, leading to a state of euphoria or mania. Herding behavior is 
an integral part of manias or fads. Then, an event (e.g., real estate price implosion or a large bank 4 
 
failure) occurs that triggers a reversal in expectations and wakes up investors that assets are badly 
overpriced. The disturbance must be such to alter fundamentally future anticipated profits. Asset 
prices implode as speculators unload risky assets. The interaction between profits and speculation 
sets up a vicious circle that drives up interest rates and leads to a rush for liquidity. In the panic phase 
of debt liquidation, inflation falls below expectations. Disinflation forces a rise in the real value of 
debt and debtors suffer a decline in net worth. Business contraction occurs through debt deflation. 
Even in the absence of disinflation, the same mechanism is operative through a decline in asset prices 
that reduces the value of collateral and forces borrowers to put up more security for a given nominal 
value of debt. The end result is that banks become fragile and governments respond by providing 
public assistance; see Fratianni (2008). While policy makers tend to argue that government 
intervention is superior to the alternative of letting banks fail, the injection of public funds in banking 
involves not only large current costs but also large future ones by inducing more opportunistic 
behavior on the part of banks (for example, the too-big-too-fail policy). 
 
Unique features of the subprime crisis  
The subprime crisis has many features of the timeline implied by the CBB hypothesis. Yet, as it is true 
for other crises, some characteristics are unique to this crisis, such as the transfer of assets from the 
balance sheets of banks to the markets, the creation of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings 
agencies to properly assess the risk of such assets, and the application of fair value accounting. 
Subprime mortgages were an innovation of the 1990s, spurred by the demise of usury laws, financial 
deregulation, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 that gave incentives to lenders to extend 
loans to individuals with low income and limited or outright poor credit histories (Gramlich 2007). The 
Act was accompanied by “regulatory relief”, especially with regard to the two government-sponsored 
agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Wallison 2009).  5 
 
   In 1994, subprime loans were five percent of total mortgage origination; by 2005, it had risen 
to 20 percent. Over the period 1994-2005, this market grew at an average annual growth rate of 26 
percent and expanded home ownership by an estimated 12 million units. A great deal of subprime 
origination was made by independent, federally unregulated, lenders who applied adjustable interest 
rates and often so-called teaser rates. Practices, such as excluding taxes and interest rates from escrow 
accounts and prepayment penalties, were widespread. All of this was driven by the property boom. 
The credit boom and the politics of lending led to a progressive deterioration of credit standards from 
2001 to 2007 (Demyanyk and van Hembert forthcoming). Simple descriptive statistics show a negative 
correlation between changes in the quantity of subprime loans and changes in denial rates on subprime 
loan applications, and a positive correlation between changes in the quantity of subprime loans and 
changes in the ratio of loan size to borrower’s income (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008, Figure 4). Declining 
lending standards were correlated with rapid home price appreciation, evidence that is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the housing boom was driving both the expansion of credit and declining lending 
standards. Finally, an expansive monetary policy was providing added impetus to a loosening of the 
standards (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2008, especially p. 18). The link between CBB and monetary policy is 
hardly surprising; for a review of the evidence see Berger and Udell (2004).  
  Actual and projected write-downs on low-quality mortgages represent approximately 25 
percent of estimated losses on prime, commercial real estate, and consumer and corporate loans; and 9 
percent of the estimated mark-to-market losses on asset-backed securities (ABS), collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO), prime mortgage-backed securities (MBS), collateralized MBS (CMBS), 
collateralized loan obligations (CLO), and corporate debt; see IMF (2008a, Table 1.1).
2 Large default 
rates on subprime mortgages cannot explain the depth of this crisis. Subprime mortgages were the 
accelerant to the fire after the real estate bust short circuited in the financial house. The fire spread 
                                                      
2 The estimate of total losses, as of October 2008, is placed at $1,405 billion. 6 
 
quickly and globally because this house was built with combustible material, such as structured finance 
and inadequate supervision; a sudden rush for liquidity and fast deleveraging exacerbated by the 
practice of fair value accounting kept the fire running.  
  The innovation that best characterizes this crisis is the “originate and distribute” bank model, in 
which banks originate loans or purchase loans from specialized brokers to either sell them in the 
financial markets or transfer them to sponsored structured investment vehicles (SIV). Two serious 
problems arise with the practice of structured finance. The first regards the incentive of the originator 
to screen debtors when the loans are destined to be placed off balance sheet. Reputational 
considerations would suggest that the originator would not want to compromise its standards. 
However, the fact that regulators and accounting standards required little disclosure about 
unconsolidated off-balance sheet entities made these entities opaque to investors and lowered the cost 
of reputational loss to the sponsoring institution. To complicate matters, the ratings agencies were not 
up to the task of properly evaluating the new complex products. Errors in judgment were as glaring as 
assigning the same letter grade to a CDO and a corporate bond with sharply different default rates.
3 
The second concerns the contingency that the off-balance sheet entities may be reabsorbed by the 
sponsoring institution. Balance-sheet absorption can occur either because the sponsoring institution 
covers more than half of the trading losses of the sponsored SIV or because the sponsoring institution 
wants to prevent a downgrade of the SIV’s credit risk (IMF 2008a, Box 2.6). At that point, there is a 
reversal of the intended benefits of “originate and distribute;” namely, risk returns home and regulatory 
capital rises. The investor, having finally gained transparency in the transaction, may judge correctly 
that the sponsoring bank is overleveraged and demands for it a higher required return on capital; this 
translates into a spot drop of the share price of the consolidated bank. 
                                                      
3 Calomiris (2007, p. 19) quotes from the Bloomberg Market of July, 2007 that CDOs rated Baa by Moody suffered five-
year default rates of 24 percent, whereas corporate bonds with the same rating had default rates of 2.2 percent. 7 
 
Liquidity rush and risk repricing 
The liquidity crisis exploded in the interbank market in August of 2007 with a rise in spreads of three-
month interbank lending rates relative to policy rates and yields on three-month Treasury bills. The so-
called US TED –the difference between the three-month Libor interest rate and the three-month U.S. 
Treasury bill– under ordinary times is contained within 20 to 30 basis points. At the peak of the 
Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the South-East Asian financial crisis of 1997, it rose to approximately 
60 basis points. In the Gulf War and the crisis of Long Term Capital Management, it peaked at 
approximately 120 basis points. During the entire subprime crisis, TED has moved to uncharted 
territory. Figure 1 plots TED values for three areas of the world: the United States, Europe and the 
Pacific region. The US TED, from 15 September (the day when Lehman declared bankruptcy) to 14 
October 2008, averaged over 300 basis points and reached an all-time peak of 464 basis points on 10 
October 2008, the Friday that ended a historic week of panic selling in the equity markets. A similar 
story holds for the TED of the large European countries and Hong Kong. Japan, on the other, stands as 
a country of moderate risk. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
   The markets were gripped by fears of credit and liquidity risks, two risks distinguishable in 
theory but not in practice (IMF 2008b, pp. 78-81). The fact that the massive injections of monetary 
base by central banks were ineffective in containing the spreads in the interbank market is consistent 
with the view that market participants were worried of large credit risks and adverse selection and that 
they could not separate liquidity from credit concerns. Spreads relative to yields on government bonds 
shot up across all maturities, short and long; see IMF (2008b, Figures 4 and 5, pp. 172-3).
4 The switch 
in the public’s degree of risk aversion was justified by the mounting difficulty of gathering reliable 
                                                      
4 See Mishkin (1991) for historical evidence from the 19
th and 20
th century US panics. 8 
 
information on opaque clients in times of distress. Confronted with more uncertainty in assessing the 
true credit status of relatively opaque borrowers, creditors had no better method than applying higher 
interest rates to entire classes of borrowers. The fog shrouding banks’ balance sheets and the financial 
markets was reinforced by opaque accounting practices. To illustrate, according to reported accounting 
data, the US banking system did not yet appear severely undercapitalized: at the end of 2008, the ratio 
of Tier 1 or core capital to risk-weighted assets was 17.4 percent for small banks, 12.3 percent for 
intermediate banks, and 9.4 percent for large banks (Fratianni and Marchionne 2009). These ratios are 
way above the benchmark of 4 percent. Yet, it was widely acknowledged that banks were severely 
undercapitalized. Undercapitalization has been the biggest stumbling block to the resolution of the 
financial crisis. 
  The biggest impact of the subprime has occurred through the re-pricing of risk across a variety 
of assets and the shrinking of balance sheets. Spillovers across markets and the subsequent process of 
deleveraging are the standard prediction of the CBB hypothesis. Deleveraging can be done either by 
selling assets or by recapitalizing. Recapitalization was aggressively pursued from the second half of 
2007 through September 2008, when global banks raised $430 billion of fresh capital (IMF 2008b, p. 
22). Then, recapitalization became increasingly difficult, and leverage had to be lowered by selling 
assets in illiquid markets. Thus, in the absence of fresh capital and without significant profits to retire 
debt in the short run, the deleveraging process necessarily implies distress sales and falling asset values 
(Adrian and Shin 2008, Figure 2.5).  The shorter the horizon over which deleveraging occurs, the more 
dramatic is the implosion of asset prices. The rapidly rising risk aversion of the public, fed by bad 
news and the thick fog of asymmetric information, was pushing financial institutions to compress 
leverage quickly. Fair value accounting aggravated the problem through its pro-cyclical bias. Lower 
accounting asset prices impact negatively on regulatory capital and may have pushed bankers to 
engage in liquidation sales that further depressed asset prices.    9 
 
Markets’ reaction 
To have an appreciation of the extent of the financial maelstrom, we need to turn to market data. For 
this purpose, we collected equity prices for a sample of banks from three areas of the world: the United 
States, Western Europe, and the Pacific region. The actual list, shown in the Appendix, includes 45 US 
banks, 49 banks from 14 different Western European countries, and 26 banks from three different 
Pacific region countries.
5 The listed banks tend to be large and thus capable of engaging in complex 
structured finance. We provide three sets of descriptive statistics. The first, displayed in Figure 2, are 
market capitalization values for the three bank-area aggregates. The second, displayed in Figure 3, are 
holding-period dollar rates of return, again for the three bank-area aggregates. The third, shown in 
Table 1, provides rates of return, both in local currency and in dollars, for banks aggregated at the 
country level. The sample period goes from 31 July 2007, our benchmark of pre-crisis date, to 31 July 
2009, our last observation. To simplify the presentation, we have taken a few benchmark dates in 
computing market capitalization and rates of return: the end of 2007, the end of the first and second 
quarter of 2008, 14 September 2008, the end of 2008, 6 March 2009 and the final observation of 31 
July 2009. Some dates, such as quarter ends, are arbitrary but serve the purpose of underscoring the 
time evolution of the crisis. The 14 September 2008 is significant because is the day before Lehman 
Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, an event widely believed to have represented a 
watershed in the crisis. The 6 March 2009 was selected because it is the bottom of bank stock declines. 
To save space, Table 1 considers only three periods: the first phase of the crisis from 31 July 2007 to 
pre-Lehman’s failure, the expanded phase of the crisis until 6 March 2009, and a further expanded 
phase including a modest recovery that goes up to our last observation 31 July 2009.  
 [Insert Figures 2 and 3 and Table 1, here] 
                                                      
5 Only the largest listed banks are included. For Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland, we have only one bank each (see 
Appendix).  10 
 
  Over the period from 31 July 2007 to 6 March 2009, the crisis has destroyed $3.23 billion of 
market values in our sample of banks. European banks were hit the hardest with a 75 percent decline, 
the Pacific banks were hit the mildest with a 48 percent decline, and US banks fared in the middle 
with a 68 percent decline; see Figure 1. The decline, furthermore, was at least twice as large after 
September 14, 2009 than in the previous sub-period. This is quite apparent from the holding-period 
rates of return shown in Figure 2, and corroborates the view that the Lehman failure was perceived by 
the market as a critical event.  
  Table 1 compares rates of return at the national level, using both local-currency and dollar 
returns. Dollar returns are the sum of local-currency returns, the rate of dollar depreciation (or 
appreciation if negative) and the interaction between these two terms. The dollar depreciated relative 
to most currencies in the pre-Lehman period, appreciated in the first part of the post-Lehman period 
and then depreciated again in May of 2009. Take bank stocks of the euro area. In the pre-Lehman 
period, rates of return averaged -59 percent, over a range comprised between -42 percent for Austria 
and -92 percent for Portugal. Banks from France, Germany, Ireland and Portugal did worse than 
banks from Austria, Greece, Italy, and Spain. In the post-Lehman period, the euro average rate of 
return fell by an astounding -213 percent, over a range comprised between -102 percent for Spain and 
-404 percent for Ireland. Austrian, Belgian, German and Irish banks did much worse than French and 
Southern European banks. As we have already remarked in connection with dollar valuation, 
European bank stocks suffered the most, Pacific region bank stocks the least, and US bank stocks 
were in the middle. For most countries, but not for the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden, the 
differences between local-currency returns and dollar returns were of a small order of magnitude.  
  This massive destruction of market value can be attributed only in part to deteriorating 
fundamentals. As predicted by the CBB hypothesis, the crisis made investors much more risk averse. 
To illustrate the extent of this shift in risk aversion, Figure 4 plots the distribution of price-to-earnings 11 
 
ratios computed over 4,000 US equities for the year 2007 and 2008 (Trzcinka 2009).
6 The 2008 
distribution shifts sharply to the left of the 2007 distribution: the mean tumbles from 40.8 to 18.9, the 
10
th percentile from 10.4 to 3, the 90
th percentile from 62 to 29.5. Across a very broad range of US 
equities, investors were valuing a unit of 2008 earnings with a price multiple that was less than one 
half the price multiple accorded to 2007 earnings. In sum, rising risk aversion magnified the effect of 
deteriorating fundamentals on bank stocks. 
[Insert Figure 4, here] 
III.  GOVERNMENT RESCUE PLANS  
The rescue of several large financial institutions in the United States and in Europe was sparked by the 
migration of liquidity risk from banks to finance and followed the rapidly expanding role of 
government as a market maker of last resort to support not only big banking but also big finance. The 
list of large failed institutions is long. After the merger of Bear Stearns with JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
financed with a $29 billion loan by the Fed of New York, the US government gave an explicit and 
massive guarantee to the liabilities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that held or guaranteed at the time 
approximately $5,200 billion of mortgages. An Asset Guarantee Program was launched in the last few 
days of the Bush Administration. The original October 2008 bailout proposal of Treasury Secretary 
Paulson, discussed below, excluded a guarantee program, but Congress pushed for its inclusion 
because it was concerned with the expenditure implications. Debt and asset guaranty are politically 
attractive because governments do not have to argue the case and request funds from Congress or 
Parliament. They also entail smaller current costs than the expected present-value contingent cost, 
suggesting that government gambles for a possible resurrection of the banking system. This strategy 
was a defining characteristic of both the US S&L crisis of the Eighties and the long Japanese crisis of 
                                                      
6 There are 4,363 firms in the 2007 sample and 4,010 in the 2008 sample. 12 
 
the Nineties; and it was responsible for transforming “a relatively small cost into a staggeringly large 
one” (Glauber 2000, p. 102).
7  
  The failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15th was the high point of the financial crisis: 
credit default swap premia on a sample of North American and European commercial and investment 
banks, in fact, peaked on that day (BIS 2009, Annual Report, Graph III.1, p. 38). The following day 
AIG, the enormous international insurance company, was bailed out by the US Treasury.
8 On 
September 19th, the US Treasury announced a temporary guaranty program of up to $50 billion for 
money market mutual funds. On September 26th, the FDIC closed the activities of Washington 
Mutual, making it the largest bank failure to date. On September 29th, the UK government 
nationalized Bradford and Bingley, a large UK mortgage lender. On September 30th, Fortis received 
emergency funding from the governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. On October 
5th, the German government extended guarantees to Hypo Real Estate Bank as part of a private 
takeover.  
  In the month of October, government interventions became less ad-hoc and more directed at 
addressing systemic problems. On October 3rd, the United States established the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), authorizing the US government to purchase sub-standard illiquid assets up to an 
                                                      
7 The most egregious error in the S&L  crisis was for regulators to wish for better times (Kane 1989, ch. 3). The Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation permitted zombie thrifts to survive. To be sure, politicians were pressured by 
zombie thrifts, but, at the core, the problem lied in a weak principal-agent relationship. The public-taxpayer, the ultimate 
principal, was an unwary victim of the larger costs associated with delaying the closing of insolvent thrifts. Both the 
politician, the agent of the public, and the regulator, the agent of the politicians, were aided in their obfuscation strategy by 
the limitations of an accounting system that ignored the costs of contingent commitments like tax forgiveness and federal 
guarantees. Similar errors were repeated in Japan almost a decade later (Friedman 2000). Japanese regulators and 
supporting politicians gambled for an unlikely resurrection of the banks and their clients.  Japanese banks were encouraged 
to provide additional loans to money-losing companies, with the knowledge that regulators would not enforce capital 
adequacy rules.  At the same time, by putting on hold the reform of the deposit insurance, “the government allowed even 
the worst banks to continue to attract financing and support their insolvent borrowers” (Hoshi and Kashyap 2004, p. 9). 
8 The Federal Reserve of New York was authorized to lend to AIG up to $85 billion. An additional authorization of $37.8 
billion was approved on October 8
th.  13 
 
amount of $700 billion spread over three tranches. No sooner was the law approved than it became 
apparent that valuing sub-standard assets would be a serious problem: without a market, the 
government was likely to either overvalue “toxic” assets, thus penalizing taxpayers, or undervaluing 
them, thus penalizing potential sellers. Fortunately, there was language in the bill for the Treasury to 
use the alternative of recapitalizing banks.
9 On October 8th, the UK government revealed a £500 
billion financial support program centered on the recapitalization of the banking system. Eight banks 
were identified for immediate recapitalization: Abbey, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds, Nationwide, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Standard Chartered.
 10 The program was seen as a nationalization scheme. 
Nationalization is fastest in stopping a crisis but is invasive and has adverse long-term consequences 
on the future efficiency of the banking system. Thus, it has a relatively small cost to the taxpayer in the 
short run but has a potentially big upside in the long run. This is the solution that Italy adopted in the 
Thirties (Fratianni and Spinelli 2001, pp. 316-321). It took fifty years before the bulk of the Italian 
banking system was again privatized. Equity funding is a partial nationalization. It is less credible than 
full nationalization as a commitment mechanism to restore banks to long-term viability; it is more 
expensive than nationalization in the short run, but makes it is easier and less costly for government to 
disengage from banking once the crisis is over.  
  On October 14th, Treasury Secretary Paulson changed tack and adopted the UK model, 
although it fell short of complete nationalization.
11 The new program was relabeled TARP Capital 
Purchase Program and permitted eligible institutions to apply for preferred stocks owned by the US 
                                                      
9 Interestingly enough, the recapitalization strategy was employed  by the  Reconstruction Finance Corporation (1932-
1953), a fact that seemed to have been completely ignored by the first version of TARP. 
10  These institutions  committed to increase capital by £ 25 billion. Government would inject  £ 50 billion in the form of 
preference shares and with conditions such as limits on executive compensation, dividend policies and commitment to 
support lending to small business and home buyers. Furthermore, £250 billion would be  made available to eligible 
institutions to guarantee new short and medium term debt issuance. To obtain these guarantees the eligible institutions had 
to raise Tier 1 capital to the level deemed appropriate by government. 
11 The official announcement that Treasury would no longer purchase illiquid mortgage-related assets  was made on 
November 12. 14 
 
Treasury up to an aggregate of $250 billion.
12 On October 16th, UBS received a capital injection from 
the Swiss government. On October 19th, there was news of a capital injection in ING by the Dutch 
government. On the same day, the South Korean government announced a $130 billion financial 
rescue plan. On October 20th, it was Sweden’s turn to announce its own rescue package worth $205 
billion. On October 28th, Belgian KBC and Dutch Aegon were targeted for capital injections by their 
respective governments. On November 28
th, the Italian government unveiled a plan of issuing 
government subordinated bonds to fund targeted banks. Under this scheme, the Italian Treasury would 
borrow from the markets and lend to the banks at a much higher interest rate.
13  
Additional measures were taken in 2009, this time with more attention being paid in relieving 
banks of bad assets. The creation of a bad-asset bank worked well for the Nordic countries, especially 
for Sweden, in resolving their financial crisis of the early Nineties. Governments intervened early and 
decisively, and not only bought toxic assets but managed them. In Sweden, the crisis erupted in the 
early part of 1992; shortly after that the government purchased two large failing banks 
(Nordbanken and Gotabanken) and created two asset-management institutions (Securum and 
Retriva) to acquire and manage bad loans (Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 1998). Altogether, the 
government committed less than $10 billion to rescue the banking system.
14 The crisis was 
relatively short-lived. However, this episode suggests that certain conditions were critical in making 
the bad-asset bank model successful: a transparent political system, a well delineated plan, uncorrupt 
bank practices, a broad consensus in the population to support banks, and a competent management to 
                                                      
12 The preferred shares would pay a cumulative dividend rate of 5 percent for the first five years and 9 percent 
subsequently. Furthermore, Treasury would receive warrants to purchase common stocks for an aggregate market price of 
15 percent of the senior preferred shares; the exercise price of the warrants would be the market price of the common stock 
at the time of issuance calculated on a 20-trading day trailing average. The program had restrictions on dividend payment 
and executive salary. Nine large financial institutions declared their intentions to subscribe  to this facility for an amount of 
$ 125 billion; the announcement is dated October 28, 2008.   
13 To further limit risk for Treasury, the requesting banks would be subject to a stress test performed by the Banca d’Italia. 
14 The cost of the rescue plans, net of liquidation of assets and including appreciation in the value of government 
shares, was close to zero for Sweden and Norway and 5.3 percent of GDP for Finland; see Anderson (2009).  15 
 
run the new institutions (Ingves and Lind 1996). These conditions were not present during the deep 
and long Japanese financial crisis of the Nineties and the bank-asset model failed despite repeated 
attempts.
15 
  The purchase of banks’ low-quality assets was announced in a new US plan by Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner on February 10
th, with details unveiled on March 23
rd. In addition to 
government buying convertible preferred stock in qualified banks, the plan added a Public-Private 
Investment Program (PPIP) aimed at relieving banks of legacy assets.
16 PPIP would be funded by 
government and private financial institutions with each putting up equity of $75 to $100 billion. The 
equity would be leveraged with interest-free non-recourse loans (i.e., pledged by collateral, but without 
any personal liability for the borrower) by the FDIC and the Fed up to a ratio of 6 to 1. PPIP became 
quickly controversial. Paul Krugman (23 March 2009), from the pages of the New York Times, was 
quick in declaring, politely, that the Administration was lying on the claim that PPIP involved no 
taxpayer’s subsidy. Jeffrey Sachs (25 March 2009) titled his article in VoxEU “Will Geithner and 
Summers succeed in raiding the FDIC and Fed?” Joseph Stiglitz (31 March 2009), in the New York 
Times, labeled the PPIP “Obama’s Ersatz capitalism,” the privatizing of gains and socializing of 
losses. Peyton Young (1 April 2009), in the Financial Times, thought the PPIP would be the taxpayer’s 
curse, the parallel to the winner’s curse in auctions. The common element underlying these reactions 
was that the Plan would entail a massive and unnecessary wealth transfer from taxpayers to the 
financial markets. It was deemed unnecessary because a direct government transfer to the banks would 
                                                      
15 Four attempts were made in setting up bad-asset banks: the first in 1992, the second in 1995, the third in 1995 and the last 
(the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan) in 2003. It should be noted  that there are differences between the 
Nordic and Japanese crises, such as: the economic size of the Nordic countries was and is significantly smaller than Japan’s; 
Nordic countries were foreign net debtors, whereas Japan was a foreign net creditor;  and liberalization occurred way before 
the crisis in Sweden and Finland, helping these countries to clean up bad loans from their balance sheets through a more 
efficient financial market, whereas financial deregulation was a reaction to the crisis in Japan. 
16 The Geithner Plan also added a compulsory stress test for the 19 largest US bank holding companies. The results of this 
test were unveiled in early May and found that 9 of the 19 banks had adequate capital, while  the remaining 10 had to add 
$75 billion of fresh capital. 16 
 
be cheaper in rescuing the banks. This is because private investors would make extraordinary returns 
financed by government. Bids would rise through competition until returns would become “normal” or 
even zero. But as the price of assets rises, the transfer from taxpayers to banks would also rise. In 
essence, taxpayers would do worse than with a direct government transfer to banks. Yet, the Plan had 
to be seen from a political economy angle. Its “clever, complex and nontransparent” features –using 
Stiglitz’ words– packed great political value. Like guarantees, it obscured the true cost of government 
intervention and raised the probability of its acceptance among the public. 
  This potted history of government interventions in the financial markets is bound to be 
unfinished. At the time of writing, other governments, such as those of Germany and Spain, are either 
in the process or in the planning stage of launching new rescue facilities.  
 
Estimates of government commitments and outlays 
We present three sets of aggregate data on government rescue plans. The first estimate is due to 
Mediobanca and was posted on its Website at the end of February of 2009; see Table 2. It refers to 
actual interventions by the United States and 10 European governments to support their banking 
systems.
17 The second estimate comes from a study by the staff of the Bank of International 
Settlements and the Banca d’Italia (for short BIS-BdI) with a cut-out date for the data of 10 June 2009 
(Panetta et al. 2009, Table 1.2 p. 9); see Table 3. It differs from Mediobanca’s estimate in that it 
distinguishes between commitments and actual outlays, adds (relative to Table 2) three non European 
countries but includes a smaller set of European countries.
18 The third estimate, shown in Table 4, is 
                                                      
17 The 10 European countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Italy is excluded because it committed an unspecified amount of funds without 
incurring any expenditure. 
18 The added non European countries are Australia, Canada and Japan. As to the European countries, Italy and Spain were 
and Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Iceland, and Luxembourg were dropped. 17 
 
from BNP Paribas (2009) and is dated 1 June 2009: it has the broadest country coverage but is limited 
only to commitments.  
  According to Mediobanca’s estimates, as of February 2009 the sampled 11 governments had 
spent $633 billion in supporting their banking systems, of which 62 percent in the form of equity 
funding, 23 percent in debt guaranty, 7 percent in the purchase of bad assets, 5 percent in 
nationalization, and 3 percent in convertible bonds. The largest interventions were effected by the 
United States, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. According to the BIS-BdI study, as 
of 10 June 2009, the (differently) sampled 11 governments had made commitments for approximately 
€5,000 billion and actual outlays for €2,000 billion. The value of total guarantees appears to be greatly 
understated. Just the guarantee commitment of the US government to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as 
we have seen, exceeds $5,000 billion.
19 Six of the 11 countries are covered by the two estimates. As 
one would expect, the passage of time has meant more governments’ interventions in the banking 
system. The biggest change refers to the United States, which has moved from $278 billion in February 
to €825 billion in June, and the United Kingdom which has moved from $63 billion to €690 billion. 
The increases are more contained for France, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The BIS-BdI study 
underscores the prevalence of guarantees (83 percent of total commitments and 78 percent of outlays) 
over capital injections (14 and 19 percent, respectively) and asset purchases (3 percent for both 
commitments and outlays). The BNP Paribas estimate covers 14 EMU countries, five non-EMU 
European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, UAE and the United 
States. Total commitments amount to €5,700 billion, of which 34 per cent in the United States, 34 per 
cent in the EMU countries, and 19 percent in the United Kingdom. 
                                                      
19 At an exchange rate of  of $1.3 = €1, it would amount to €3,846.   18 
 
  In sum, the policy response to the subprime crisis started in earnest after Lehman’s failure in 
mid September 2008, accelerated after February 2009, and has become very large at the time of writing 
(September 2009). The narrative and the data have underscored that governments have relied on a 
portfolio of intervention tools, but the biggest commitments and outlays have been in the form of debt 
and asset guarantees, while purchases of bad assets have been very limited. In what follows, we 
evaluate the rescue plans from the viewpoint of financial markets, that is how bank stock prices have 
reacted to the commitment news of supporting banks. 
[Insert Tables 2-4, here] 
 
 
IV.   ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT RESCUE PLANS 
In this section, we employ event study methodology to estimate markets’ reaction to the 
announcements of government interventions. The underlying hypothesis is that both the announcement 
of a rescue plan is credible if it raises the survivability and rates of return of participating banks. 
Therefore, we can test the effects of rescue plans by computing cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 
participating banks around a window that includes announcement dates. For the actual test, we will use 
the same sample of banks in Table 1; see Appendix. Estimates of alpha, the risk free rate, and beta, the 
market risk parameter, from the capital asset price model will be based on daily market return 
observations of three sample periods: the first from 31 July 2007 to 14 September 2008 (the day before 
Lehman Brothers’ failure), the second from 15 September 2008 to 6 March 2009 (the bottom of the 
market) and the third from 7 March 2009 to our last available observation of 31 July 2009.  
  The events are of two types. The first is an announcement that the government will intervene 
to protect the banking system (for brevity, general announcement). Our main data sources are 
Mediobanca, BIS-BdI, and BNP Paribus, but we have also used information from DLA Piper, the 
International Capital Market Association and websites of Ministries of Finance or Treasury. For the 18 19 
 
countries represented in our data set, there are 37 general announcements, of which the greatest 
number pertains to capital injections; see Table 5. The second is an announcement that a specific bank 
will receive government support (for brevity, specific announcement). We have 63 specific 
announcements affecting 43 of the 120 banks in our sample, of which 4 pertain to asset purchase and 
guarantees, 8 to debt guarantees, and 51 to capital injection; see Table 6. A few banks, such as Bank of 
America and Hypo Real Estate, have multiple announcements. The 43 banks with specific 
announcements represent half of the countries in our sample.
20 Seventy seven banks from the other half 
of the countries have no announcement, in particular those from the Pacific area.  
[Insert Tables 5 and 6, here] 
  We propose three separate tests within the broad event study methodology. The first aims at 
uncovering the overall impact on banks’ equity valuation of general and specific announcements. The 
second aims at identifying the cross-area spillover effects of general announcements.
21 The third aims 
at uncovering the cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements.  
  The first test uses the entire panel of 120 banks, 37 general announcements and 63 specific 
announcements. Daily rates of returns on bank stock i of country j at time t, Rijt, are regressed on an 
intercept capturing the risk-free rate of return and on the market rate of return, R
M
jt, and two dummy 
event variables. The first dummy variable, Gjt, is equal to one during the event time window, T, around 
a general announcement, otherwise it is zero; the second dummy variable, Sit, is equal to one in the 
time window T around a specific announcement. We also break down G and S by the different 
intervention types discussed above, such as asset purchases, capital injections, and debt guarantees. We 
assume that a general announcement is more complex than a specific announcement and requires 
                                                      
20 The nine countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,  Netherlands,  UK, and US. 
21 We cannot determine cross-country spillover effects because of the collinearity of many general announcements across 
countries. 20 
 
longer time for the market to process it; in addition, it is easier for the markets to get wind of a general 
announcement than of a specific one. For this reason, we apply different windows to the two types of 
announcements: G’s window is seven days and is comprised between three working days before and 
after the announcement, whereas S’s window is five days. The test is formalized in equation (1): 
ijt it jt
M
jt ijt u S G R R + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = δ γ β α ,    (1) 
where u denotes a well-behaved error term and G and S become dummy vector when we disaggregate 
by intervention type.
22 Markets’ reaction to announcements are captured by γ and δ: within the time 
window T, CAR is predicted to be higher than returns in other periods. Since the error of the regression 
must be zero on average, the null hypothesis is that CAR within T must also be zero. A rejection of the 
null hypothesis corroborates the presence of abnormal rates of return. In our one-step formulation of 
the event study regression (1), the positive impact of news of a government intervention on rates of 
return is captured by CAR, which is equal to the sum of the estimates of parameters γ and δ multiplied 
by T; see Meulbroek (1992). 
  The second test uses bank data from each of the 3 areas, as in (2): 
3 , 2 , 1 . ,
3
1
, , , , , , = + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + = ∑
=
⋅ j u XG S G R R j it
k
j itk j k j it j j t j
M
j t j it j j θ δ γ β α  (2) 
There are two differences with respect to equation (1). The first is that coefficients are now denoted 
with a subscript “j” to indicate that they are area specific. The second is that (2) adds three area 
                                                      
22 In this case, the extended formulation is: 
() ijt
k
kit k kjt k
M




δ γ β α ,      ( 1 b )  
where k=1 indicates asset guarantees and purchase, k=2 capital injection, and k=3 debt guarantees. 21 
 
announcement dummies, XGk. Each XGk,j is equal to one during the event time window around the 
general announcement from a country of area k, except for those from the country of bank i; for 
example, XG3,1 captures the general announcement effect of area 3 (say, Pacific) on area 1 (say, USA). 
Note that XGj,j captures cross-area general announcement effects from the same area is not collinear to 
general announcement Gj.
23 The estimate of θk,j times T measures the spillover effect of general 
announcement from area k on CAR of area j’s banks.  
  The third and final test focuses on the cross-bank spillover effects of specific announcements. 
The motivation for this experiment is that during a crisis markets are shrouded in a fog of ignorance 
about the true extent of banks’ difficulties. The news that one large bank will be receiving government 
support sends two separate signals: the first is that other banks of similar size are likely to be in the 
same predicament and the second is that if government saves a large bank is also likely to save 
another. The failure of Lehman’s Brothers shook the markets exactly because it was a glaring 
exception to the too-big-to-fail principle.
24 It is doubtful that Treasury Secretary Paulson would have 
taken the same decision had he anticipated the markets’ reaction. Given the limitations of our data, we 
restrict the test to the seven largest US banks: Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs, American Express, and Morgan Stanley. We selected these banks on the base of the 
average market capitalization of the pre-crisis period from 31 July 2007 to 14 August 2008. Banks in 
our sample represent more than 60 percent of the US bank market capitalization, 100 percent of asset 
guarantees and purchases, 100 percent of debt guarantees, and 90 percent of capital injections. The 
formulation of this test is given by equation (3): 
 
                                                      
23 For example, XG3,3 captures the general announcement effect of n-1 countries of area 3 (e.g., Australia and 
Honk-Kong) on other n
th country of the same area (say, Japan). 
24  For evidence of the too-big-to-fail principle, see O’Hara and Shaw (1990). 22 
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where subscript “j” was dropped because all i banks are located in the same country. XSk,i indicates the 
cross-specific announcement of bank k on bank i. Note that the own S is equal to the cross-specific 
announcement when i=k. Coefficent γi captures the effect of US G, δi the effect of S for the i
th bank 
(say, Bank of America), λk≠i the effect of S for the k
th bank (say, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs, American Express, and Morgan Stanley).  
 
Findings 
Table 7 shows estimates of equation (1) for the period spanning from 31 July 2007 to 31 July 2009 and 
the three sub-periods we have already used for Table 1: the pre-crisis from 31 July 2007 to 14 
September 2008, the crisis from 15 September 2008 to 6 March 2009, and the post-crisis from 7 March 
2009 to 31 July 2009. We have 34,354 observations in the first period, 14,697 in the second and 
12,416 in the third. We test equation (1) by first aggregating all types of general and specific 
announcements and then using the three specific categories of asset purchase, capital injections, and 
debt guarantees (see equation (1b); e.g, G1 = general announcement of asset purchase, S2 = specific 
announcement of capital injection). We recall that G has a seven-day window and S a five-day 
window. We did experiment with different window lengths: results tend weaken as the window is 
enlarged, in particular for specific announcements. The bulk of the announcements occurs in the 
second period; see Tables 5 and 6. The panel is estimated with fixed country effects, a specification 23 
 
that is not rejected by the Hausman (1978).
25 In addition to the variables indicated on the right-hand 
side of equation (1), we have added the logarithmic value of bank capitalization expressed in dollars. 
In fact, bank size turns out to have positive and statistically significant effects in the first and second 
periods.  
  The key finding of Table 7 is that announcements, general as well as specific, have a 
statistically significant and economically relevant impact on banks’ rates of return. Over the entire 
two-year period, CAR were almost 5 percentage points higher than normal returns for general 
announcements and 6 percentage points lower than normal returns for specific announcements. The 
signs of the coefficients reflect differences in the way markets evaluate the two types of 
announcements. General announcements are taken as signals that governments want to protect the 
banking systems. The banking industry, as a whole, receives support and rates of return to shareholders 
rise “abnormally” over the announcement window. Specific announcements are more problematic for 
the markets. During times of relative transparency, when markets face stable information flows and 
price with relative efficiency banks’ future net cash flows, S is evaluated as a boost to shareholders’ 
return. On the other hand, in the fog of a financial crisis, when markets are extremely uncertain about 
the quality of the assets they have to evaluate, S is taken as a revelation of partially unknown troubles; 
CAR may turn to be negative. On this point, it is worth mentioning that particularly hectic activities 
took place in the first half of October 2008, when governments intervened on a big scale to stabilize 
their banking systems; see Figure 5. Over a two-week period, policy makers first tried to purchase or 
                                                      
25 The Hausman (1978) specification test uses the statistic  ) ( ) ( ) (
1
RE FE RE FE RE FE Var N H β β β β β β − − ′ − =
−  to 
compare fixed effects with random effects, where N = number of observations,  FE β  and  RE β  are respectively the vector 
of coefficients in the FE and RE model, and Var(.) indicates the variance-covariance operator; H has a chi-squared 
distribution. In Table 7, except for the last column, the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients from the fixed- effect 
model is not systematically different from the coefficients  of the random-variable model is rejected. In this case, that is 
under the alternative hypothesis, the random-effect model is inconsistent, where the fixed-effect model is. In the last 
column, the Hausman test fails to meet asymptotic assumptions.  24 
 
guarantee assets, then moved to inject capital into banks, and finally decided to guarantee bank debts. 
The fact that three different strategies were adopted in such a brief time span underscores the state of 
confusion, if not outright panic, enshrouding government decisions. Capital markets were extremely 
opaque in the immediate wake of Lehman’s failure  
  Differences in the information environment appear to be corroborated by the CAR pattern in 
the three sub-periods: S has a positive impact on R in the pre-crisis sub-period, when announcements 
are few and markets have relative confidence in the “normal” information flow; but the opposite takes 
place in the turbulent crisis sub-period when announcements are the order of the day and markets 
mistrust the “normal” information flow. These results appear consistent with the observed reluctance 
of individual institutions to come forth with requests for public assistance. Fear of being identified as a 
“bad apple” was also the reason why some banks were reticent, during 2008, to apply at central banks 
for emergency lending.  
  The key finding of the second group of estimates of Table 7 is that the markets do not 
distinguish between the relative efficacy of different types of announcements. In fact, we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that G1, G2, G3, and similarly for S, exert equivalent impacts on R.
26 These results 
suggest two policy implications. The first is that, during a big financial crisis, markets value timely and 
big actions without little regard to refinements on the type of actions undertaken. The different long-
run consequences of different interventions are ignored. The similitude with a war is compelling. Like 
in a war, participants in a financial crisis want to survive: planning horizons are shortened and 
considerations that are taken seriously under normal circumstances are instead relegated to minor roles 
in a crisis. This pattern is consistent with the lessons from Nordic and Japanese banking crises: timely 
                                                      
26 The Wald test shows that the announcements, taken as a whole, have a non-zero impact on rates of return for the entire 
period and the crisis sub-period. The F test on G and S pairs shows that effect similarity cannot be rejected. For the pre-
crisis period, the F test cannot be done because of the scarcity of announcements. 25 
 
and big public interventions solved successfully the crisis in Sweden, whereas untimely and small 
government measures led to the lost Japanese decade. The second is that, given that different 
announcements produce equivalent effects, governments have incentives to gamble for opaque and 
“low-cost” guarantees of bank assets and debts rather than undertake more transparent and costly 
alternatives.  
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 5, here] 
  Table 8 presents the results of equation (2), where our 120 banks have been divided into the 
three geographical groups of Figure 1: Europe, the Pacific area, and the United States. The motivation 
of the test is to unveil possible cross-area announcement effects. Thus, a bank in a given country will 
respond not only to its country’s general announcement and its own specific announcement but also to 
the general announcements concerning other banks abroad. The key finding is that there are five 
statistically significant cross-area coefficients: with the exception of the cross-area Pacific XGPACIFIC in 
the Pacific area regression and cross-area USA in the Europe regression, the remaining three show a 
negative impact on banks’ returns. These negative values are consistent with a view that foreign rescue 
plans are perceived by home banks as a subsidy and, thus, giving a competitive advantage to foreign 
banks. However, in the Pacific area a subsidy to a given bank appears to benefit all other banks in the 
area. Note the “anomaly” of γ < 0 and θUSA > 0 (although marginally significant) in the Europe 
regression. We reran the regression, separately, only for UK banks and for Euro-area banks. This 
distinction is justified on two grounds. The first is that, as we have noted in our narrative of rescue 
plans, formal British capital injections were de-facto nationalizations that tend to be unfavorable to 
private shareholders. The second is that Euro-area banks enjoy the benefits of the euro and emergency 
lending by the European Central Bank. The two regressions confirm that the UK has a strong and 
dominant impact on the entire group of European banks, and that, if one controls for a common 
currency and a common central bank with lending-of-last resort power, we obtain again that the own G 26 
 
effect on bank returns is positive and statistically significant, whereas the XGUSA effect vanishes. The 
economic relevance of the own G, is worth mentioning, is three times larger for US banks than for 
European and Pacific area banks, reflecting the more aggressive and extensive nature of US 
intervention plans.  
  Table 9 shows the estimates of equation (3), focusing on cross-bank spillover effects of 
specific announcements within a banking system. For the data, we select the top seven US banks by 
market capitalization as of 31 July 2007: Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, 
Goldman Sachs, American Express Co. and Morgan Stanley.
27 There are three statistically significant 
own S effects: those of Bank of America and Goldman Sachs, which are consistent with reluctant 
borrowing behavior, and those of Wells Fargo, which indicate a big boost to shareholders. The Wells 
Fargo’s announcement, furthermore, gives a big boost also to the shareholders of Bank of America, 
Citigroup and American Express. On the other hand, the announcement concerning Bank of America 
has a negative impact on R of Citigroup; that of Citigroup has a negative impact on JP Morgan; and 
that of JPMorgan has a negative impact on American Express. What to make of these signs? We recall 
that an S announcement may signal unexpected and unpriced financial difficulties; but it could also 
signal that if government saves a large bank it is also likely to save another at least just as big. Wells 
Fargo is the fourth largest bank. Based on the too-big-to-fail principle, the S announcement for Wells 
Fargo would be interpreted that banks larger than Wells Fargo (Bank of America, Citigroup and JP 
Morgan) would also receive government support; hence, the cross-effect should be positive. But the 
positive impact of Well Fargo’s announcement on American Express is not consistent with the 
rankings. Of course, it is plausible that American Express may be lower than Wells Fargo in market 
                                                      
27 The top two institutions, Bank of America and Citigroup, had similar market capitalization (respectively $213 and $210 
billion); JP Morgan was approximately three-quarters of their size, Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs half of their size, and 
Express and Morgan Stanley one third of their size. Note that this selection is robust to different market valuations obtained 
at different dates. 27 
 
capitalization but higher in the degree of interconnectedness. Clearly, there is more to the story of too 
big to fail than sheer market capitalization. 
  In sum, the findings on equations (1) through (3) show that: general and specific 
announcements are priced by the market as CAR over the selected windows; general announcements 
tend to generate positive CAR and specific announcements negative CAR; general announcements 
exert cross-area spillovers but are perceived by the home-country banks as subsidies boosting the 
competitive advantage of foreign banks; and specific announcements exert spillovers on other banks.  
[Insert Tables 8 and 9, here] 
  We have ignored the impact that monetary policy might have had on our tests. There are 
three possible channels for monetary policy to influence our regressions. The first is that it may affect 
the estimate of β but not the estimates of γ and δ. Suppose that, by ignoring an expansive monetary 
policy, we have overestimated β. It follows that the G effects would be underestimated. Thus, the test 
we have performed is biased against us. The second is that we ignore the impact of monetary policy at 
home and abroad. If those policies were idiosyncratic, there would be a distortion in our estimates of 
the XG effects. But, the evidence suggests that monetary policies were expansive and coordinated after 
the failure of Lehman Brothers, implying that such a distortion does not arise. The third is that 
expansive monetary policies were positively correlated with expansive fiscal policies. Had we 
introduced a separate effect for monetary policy, the policy collinearity would have prevented us from 
detecting separate effects. In sum, to ignore monetary policy reactions to the crisis at the minimum 
should not affect our findings but it is likely to bias the test against us. 
  
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The great financial crisis of 2007-2009 had its roots in a credit boom that manifested itself in an 
extremely indebted US economy and in a high appetite for risk by investors. The collapse of the real 28 
 
estate market in 2006 and the high failure rates of subprime mortgages were the first symptom of a 
credit boom tuned to bust. These defaults spread the fire in a financial system that had become fragile 
as a result of several factors that are unique to this crisis: the transfer of assets from the balance sheets 
of banks to the markets, the creation of complex and opaque assets, the failure of ratings agencies to 
properly assess the risk of such assets, and the application of fair value accounting. To these novel 
factors, one must add the more standard failure of regulators and supervisors in spotting and correcting 
the emerging weaknesses.  
  Banks’ undercapitalization has been the biggest stumbling block to the resolution of the 
financial crisis. From the end of July 2007 to 6 March 2009, our sample of 120 large US, Western 
European, and Pacific region banks lost $3,232 billion of capitalization. European banks were hit the 
hardest; US banks were next. The bulk of the losses occurred after the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
This massive destruction of market value can be attributed only in part to deteriorating fundamentals. 
The financial crisis, not surprisingly, made investors much more risk averse. Based on US equities, 
investors were valuing, on average, a unit of 2008 earnings with a price multiple that was less than half 
the price multiple accorded to 2007 earnings. Rising risk aversion and deteriorating fundamentals 
reinforced each other in a brutal manner.   
  Banks’ undercapitalization explains the persistence of the crisis and is the reason why 
governments continue to inject vast sums of public funds into banks. The first rescue plans started after 
Lehman’s failure in mid September 2008 and were ad-hoc responses to specific negative events. In 
October of the same year, governments began to focus on systemic problems. We have shown 
quantitative summaries of both commitments and actual disbursements using alternative sources. 
Estimates, naturally, vary depending on country and time coverage. The two latest estimates –one by 
the BIS and the other by BNP Paribas– show that governments have committed aggregate sums in 
excess of €5 trillion to support their fragile banking systems and actually disbursed two-fifths of the 29 
 
committed funds. Both in absolute terms and in relation to the size of the economies, these 
interventions are extraordinarily large. We will have to wait for careful historical research to judge 
whether these interventions represent an all-time record. In addition to size, governments have 
employed a portfolio of intervention tools. The biggest commitments and outlays have been in the 
form of debt and asset guarantees, while purchases of bad assets have been limited. Political-economy 
considerations explain the high weight assigned to opaque and complex guarantees. 
  We found that general and specific announcements were priced by the markets as cumulative 
abnormal rates of return over the window periods. General announcements tend to be associated with 
positive abnormal returns and specific announcements with negative abnormal returns; general 
announcements exert cross-area spillovers but are perceived by the home-country banks as subsidies 
boosting the competitive advantage of foreign banks; and specific announcements exert spillovers on 
other banks. Our results were also sensitive to the information environment. Specific announcements 
tend to exert a positive impact on rates of return in the pre-crisis sub-period, when announcements are 
few and markets have relative confidence in the “normal” information flow. The opposite takes place 
in the turbulent crisis sub-period when announcements are the order of the day and markets mistrust 
the “normal” information flow. These results appear consistent with the observed reluctance of 
individual institutions to come forth with requests for public assistance. Fear of being identified as a 
“bad apple” was also the reason why some banks were reticent, during 2008, to apply at central banks 
for emergency lending. 
  The crisis is not likely to end until balance sheets will have expurgated toxic assets. Banks 
will not resume lending until balance sheets will have been cleansed and undercapitalization has been 
overcome. Banking systems remain fragile and additional government funds may be required to 
stabilize banks. Given that governments will have diminished resources, the greatest challenge may 
well be for politicians to convince an enraged public of the necessity of either injecting additional 30 
 
funds into the banking systems or undertaking outright nationalizations. In the 1990s, Japan paid very 
dearly, with a so-called lost decade, for delaying the recapitalization of the banking system. The 
financial crisis in Japan started in 1991 and was induced by a real estate boom pierced by a tightening 
of monetary policy. The crisis was most severe from the middle of 1994 to 1996; there was a 
reoccurrence in 1997. Legislation to use public funds to recapitalize the banks was passed only in 
February of 1998 (Nakaso 2001, p. 11). Public’s hostility to use taxpayers’ funds was the main reason 
for the costly delay.  
  We end with a cautionary note on the relationship between risk taking and moral hazard. 
Government rescue plans tend to consolidate the banking system in fewer and bigger players. This, in 
turn, raises the probability of invoking the too-big-to-fail policy. Given the strain on public finances 
created by the current crisis, it is now time to ask the question of when too-big-to-fail institutions 
become too big to be saved.  
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Figure 1: TED (or equivalent spread) by countries. Source: Bloomberg. 
 
NOTES: TED for USA (US); TED equivalent spreads for United Kingdom (UK), Honk-Kong (HK), Japan (JP), DE 
(Germany), France (FR) and Italy (IT). There is not TED equivalent spreads for other countries. United Kingdom has 3-
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Figure 2: Market capitalization of a sample of US, European , and Pacific region banks from end of July, 
2007 to July 31, 2009,  in US$ billion.   
NOTES: CME Group Inc., Discover Financial Services, Fukuoka Financial Group, and Invesco Ltd were excluded from the 


































Figure 3: Holding-period dollar rates of return on  a sample of US, European, and Pacific region banks 
from end of July, 2007 to July 31, 2009.  
NOTES: CME Group Inc., Discover Financial Services, Fukuoka Financial Group, and Invesco Ltd were excluded from the 




Figure 4: Shift in the price-earnings ratio of US stocks, 2007-2008.  
NOTES: 2007 P/E and 2008 P/E observations refer to end of January 2008 and 2009, respectively. Source: F529 class 
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Table 1:  Rates of returns local currency and in dollars on selected US,  European and 
Pacific region banks, in percent, end of July 2007 to July 31, 2009. 
Area  Country  31/07/2007 14/09/2008  31/07/2007 06/03/2009  31/07/2007 31/07/2009 
    LCU  EXC  USD LCU EXC USD  LCU EXC USD 
Europe AT  -42.29 3.31  -40.38 -199.61 -7.86 -191.78 -104.68 4.06  -104.87
   BE  -54.67 3.31  -53.17 -287.72 -7.86 -272.96 -160.25 4.06  -162.69
   DE  -62.64 3.31  -61.40 -297.29 -7.86 -281.78 -207.92 4.06  -212.30
   ES  -43.14 3.31  -41.26 -101.61 -7.86 -101.48 -45.16 4.06  -42.93
   FR  -64.80 3.31  -63.64 -178.66 -7.86 -172.47 -104.34 4.06  -104.52
   GR  -42.61 3.31  -40.71 -161.66 -7.86 -156.81 -85.64 4.06  -85.06
   IE  -88.06 3.31  -87.66 -403.63 -7.86 -379.75 -239.22 4.06  -244.87
   IT  -42.65 3.31  -40.75 -134.29 -7.86 -131.59 -79.21 4.06  -78.37
   PT  -92.74 3.31  -92.50 -153.90 -7.86 -149.66 -121.45 4.06  -122.32
   CH  13.52 5.88  20.19 14.64 4.21 19.47 15.44 11.94  29.22
   DK  -49.98 3.10  -48.43 -169.91 -8.01 -164.30 -77.06 3.97  -76.15
   NO  -30.46 1.44  -29.45 -126.41 -19.53 -121.25 -37.62 -5.14 -40.82
   SE  -45.72 -0.02  -45.73 -155.59 -31.50 -138.08 -72.10 -7.22 -74.11
   UK  -54.12 -12.92 -60.05 -233.67 -36.69 -184.63 -116.96 -19.76 -113.61
Europe Total     -50.92 1.05  -50.32 -175.20 -13.32 -163.14 -96.96 0.19  -96.53
Pacific HK  -12.04 0.39  -11.70 -77.53 0.92 -77.33 -12.71 0.98  -11.86
   JP  -43.66 10.26  -37.87 -109.63 19.65 -111.53 -78.37 23.12  -73.36
   AU  -30.34 -5.06  -33.87 -81.02 -29.35 -86.59 -40.53 -3.01 -42.32
Pacific Total     -30.34 3.42  -28.54 -92.49 1.89 -94.60 -48.28 9.76  -46.23
USA US  -39.27 0.00  -39.27 -166.92 0.00 -166.92 -93.74 0.00  -93.74
USA Total     -39.27 0.00  -39.27 -166.92 0.00 -166.92 -93.74 0.00  -93.74
 
NOTES: LCU = rate of return in local-currency units; EXC = depreciation/appreciation of the US dollar relative to 
the local currency; USD = rate of return in dollars; AT=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; 
DK=Denmark; ES=Spain; FR=France; GR=Greece; IE=Eire; IT=Italy; NO=Norway; PT=Portugal; SE=Sweden; 
UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; HK=Hong-Kong; JP=Japan; US=United States. CME Group Inc., Discover 
Financial Services, Fukuoka Financial Group, and Invesco Ltd were excluded from the sample of 120 banks because 
they did not make the list at the end of July 2007. Source: Bloomberg (August 7, 2009). 
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Table 2:  Government interventions to support  banks, by country and types through 
February 2009 (in million USD) 
Country 
Public intervention in banks by country and typology    





Funding  Nationalization 
AT              0,00
(a) 0,000
BE         10,504 6,759  17,263
CH     6,799       6,799
DE     10,430 144,856 16,101   171,387
EI       1,923 5,550 0,000  7,473
FR         18,204   18,204
IS        0,829  0,829
LU     4,050      4,050
NL  42,543      23,211  65,753
UK         63,037 0,00
(a) 63,037
US         278,804   278,804
Total 42,543  21,278 146,779 392,200 30,799  633,599
 
NOTES: AT=Austria; BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; ES=Spain; 
FR=France; GR=Greece; IE=Eire; IT=Italy; NO=Norway; PT=Portugal; SE=Sweden; UK=United 
Kingdom; AU=Australia; HK=Hong-Kong; JP=Japan; US=United States. (a) Government bought 





Table 3: Overview of commitments and outlays as of 10 June 2009
* 
      Capital Injections  Debt Guarantees  Asset purchase  Asset Guarantees (1)  Total 
Euro billions and  
percentage points   
     
 % of 
GDP 
(2008)   




(end-2008)   
 % of 
GDP 
(2008)  




(end-2008)   
 % of 
GDP 
(2008) 




(end-2008)   
 % of 
GDP 
(2008)  





  Euro 
billions  
 % of 
GDP 
(2008)  





 Australia    Commitments     –     –     –     UNS    UNS    UNS     –     –     –     –     –     –     UNS     UNS    UNS   
   Outlays     –     –     –     62     10.4     4.6     –     –     –     –     –     –     62     10.4    4.6   
 Canada    Commitments     –     –     –     UNS    UNS    UNS     –     –     –     –     –     –     UNS     UNS    UNS   
   Outlays     –     –     –     0     0     0     –     –     –     –     –     –     –     –     –   
 France    Commitments     43     2.2     0.6     320    16.4     4.2     –     –     –     5     0.2     0.1     368     18.9    4.8   
   Outlays     28     1.4     0.4     72     3.7     0.9     –     –     –     5     0.2     0.1     104     5.3     1.4   
 Germany    Commitments    80  3.2 1  420  16.9 5.3  UNS  UNS UNS    200  8 2.5  700  28.1 8.9 
   Outlays    22  0.9 0.3  129  5.2 1.6 0  0 0  0  0 0  151  6.1 1.9 
 Italy  Commitments    20  1.3 0.5  UNS  UNS UNS   –     –     –     –     –     –    UNS  UNS UNS 
   Outlays    10  0.6 0.3 0  0 0   –     –     –     –     –     –     10    0.6 0.3 
 Japan    Commitments    105  2.5 0.9  –     –     –    8  0.2 0.1   –     –     –    113  2.7 0.9 
   Outlays    3  0.1 0  –     –     –    0  0 0   –     –     –    3  0.1 0 
 Netherlands   Commitments     37     6.2     1.7     200    33.6     9.0     –     –     –     28     4.7     1.3     265     44.6    11.9   
   Outlays     31     5.1     1.4     40     6.8     1.8     –     –     –     28     4.7     1.3     99     16.6    4.4   
 Spain    Commitments    UNS  UNS UNS 100  9.1 3  –     –     –     –     –     –    UNS  UNS UNS 
   Outlays    0  0 0  31  2.8 0.9  –     –     –     –     –     –     31    2.8 0.9 
 Switzerland   Commitments     4     1.1     0.2     UNS    UNS    UNS     27     7.6    1.3     –     –     –     UNS    UNS UNS 
   Outlays     4     1.1     0.2     0     0     0     27     7.6    1.3     –     –     –     31     8.7     1.5   
 United 
Kingdom    Commitments    54  3.4 0.7  269  17.2 3.4  –     –     –    523  33.4 6.7  845  54 10.8 
   Outlays    54  3.4 0.7  113  7.2 1.4  –     –     –    523  33.4 6.7  690  44.1 8.8 
 United States Commitments    335  3 3.4  1,760  15.7 18  115  1 1.2 281  2.5 2.9  2,491  22.3 25.5 
   Outlays    237  2.1 2.4  271  2.4 2.8  36  0.3 0.4  281  2.5 2.9 825  7.4 8.4 
 Total commitments   677     2.6     1.1     3,131   11.8     5.2     150    0.6    0.3     1,036     3.9     1.7     4,994    18.8    8.3   
 Total outlays      387     1.5     0.6     719    2.7     1.2     64     0.2    0.1     836     3.2     1.4     2,006    7.6     3.3   
 
* As of 10 June 2009 unless otherwise specified. UNS = unspecified amount; “–” = no program/action. Banking sector assets are consolidated data of: 
for Australia, banks, credit unions, building societies and corporations; for Canada, chartered banks; for Japan, depository corporations (banks and 
collectively managed trusts); for Switzerland, all domestic banks; for the five euro area countries and the United Kingdom, monetary financial 
institutions; and for the United States, commercial banks. 




Table 4: Overview of  Policy Measures from 15 September 2008 to 1 June 2009. 




New Debt Issuance 
Guarantees  Others  Local 
Currency (bn)  EURbn % of 
GDP   
Austria  15  85    100  100  37.0   Includes Dexia, Ethias, Fortis and KBC  
Belgium 19.6      19.6  19.6  5.9   
Cyprus 2     2  2  12.8   
Finland 4  50    54  54  30.1   
France  24  320    344  344  18.2   Includes Dexia  
Germany 80 400   480  480  19.8     
Greece 5  15  8  28  28  12.3     
Ireland 7  400    407  407  213.5     
Italy 12    40  52  52  3.4   
Luxembourg  2.9      2.9  2.9  0.8   Includes Fortis, but not ING  
Netherlands 36.8  200    236.8  236.8  41.6   Illiquid Assets Facility  
Portugal 4 20    24  24  14.7   
Slovenia  12  1  13  13  39.0   
Spain    209  50  259  259  24.6   Includes guarantee on loan to Caja Castilla La Mancha  
Eurozone 197.8 1,711 99  2,028  1,955  21.0     
Australia    8  8  4  0.7     
Canada   218  125  343  259  22.3     
Denmark  100      100  13.4  5.9   Plus losses over DKK35bn on bank liabilities  
Hungary 1.5**  1.5**   3.1**  2.3  2.2   
Japan 13000    7691  20691  161.2  4.0   
Norway 100    350  450  51.1  19.8   
Qatar 6**      6**  4.7  8.8   
SaudiArabia 3**      3**  2.4  0.8   
SouthKorea 14.2**  100** 40.8**  155*  114.9  16.3   
Sweden 65  1,500    1,565  145.8  51.0   
Switzerland 6      6 4  1.0    Capitalisation of UBS Excludes Special Liquidity  
UK 678.1  250  635  963.1  1,059  68.7    Scheme (GBP200bn) but includes Asset Protection Scheme  
UAE 19**      19**  14.7  9.6     
US  350  1,400***  750**** 2,500  1,925  18.1   Does not include Fed’s facilities, such as the MMIFF but does include TALF 
 
NOTES: * Includes capital injections, asset buying and guarantees on debt issuance. Excludes deposit guarantees. ** In USD *** FDIC estimate of total size of unsecured debt 
falling under its guarantee. **** Includes USD500bn for PPIF, USD200bn for TALF, USD50bn for foreclosure prevention. Source: BNP Paribus. 41 
 
 
  Table 5: Timeline of general announcements (USD millions) 
Date Country 
Measure 





and Guarantees  Nationalization 
21/04/08 UK 99,065        99,065 
30/09/08 EI 14,081        14,081 
02/10/08 GR  6,927        6,927 
03/10/08 US      700,000    700,000 
05/10/08 DK  0.1        0.1 
07/10/08 ES    136,490  68,245    204,735 
08/10/08 IT  -        - 
 UK  952,050  432,750      1,384,800 
12/10/08 AU    -      - 
 PT    26,942      26,942 
13/10/08 DE 53,884  545,669  53,884    653,437 
 FR  53,884  431,072      484,956 
 IT   -     - 
 US  250,000        250,000 
14/10/08 HK  -        - 
 US    2,250,000      2,250,000 
16/10/08 CH 60,000        60,000 
17/10/08 BE    -      - 
24/10/08 NO    51,071      51,071 
26/10/08 AT 18,959  107,432      126,390 
29/10/08 SE 195,277        195,277 
03/11/08 AT        0  0 
05/11/08 CH    -      - 
28/11/08 IT  -        - 
17/12/08 JP 136,612        136,612 
18/01/09 DK 17,770        17,770 
19/01/09 UK      73,685    73,685 
03/02/09 JP      11,225    11,225 
10/02/09 US  -    -    - 
12/02/09 EI  8,975        8,975 
25/02/09 IT 15,277        15,277 
26/02/09 UK      466,115    466,115 
06/03/09 DE        -  - 
17/03/09 JP 10,116        10,116 
23/03/09 US 500,000        500,000 
13/05/09 DE      272,240    272,240 
09/06/09 US  -        - 
22/07/09 HK    -      - 
Total 2,392,877  3,981,426 1,645,394  -  8,019,696 
 
NOTES: - = unspecified amount. Sources: Mediobanca, BIS-BdI, DLA Piper, International Capital 
Market Association, and websites of national Ministries of Treasury or Finance. 42 
 
 
  Table 6: Timeline of specific announcements (USD millions) 
Data Country  Bank 
Measure 
AP CI DG 
14/03/2008  US  JP Morgan Chase & Co.        29000
30/09/2008  BE  Dexia     4224.3    
  FR  Dexia     4224.3    
06/10/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate        67540
13/10/2008  UK  Lloyds TSB     22900.7    
   RBS      26942   
27/10/2008  BE  KBC     4356.1    
28/10/2008  US  Bank of America     15000    
    Bank of New York Mellon     3000   
   Citigroup      25000   
    Goldman Sachs Group     10000   
    JP Morgan Chase & Co.     25000   
   Morgan  Stanley      10000   
    State Street Corp.     2000   
    Wells Fargo Bank     25000   
03/11/2008  DE  Commerzbank     10429.58    
13/11/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate        25052
17/11/2008  US  BB&T Corp.     3133.64    
   Comerica      2250   
    First Horizon National Corp.     866.54   
   Huntington  Bancshares      1398.071   
   Key  Corp.      2500   
    Marshall & Ilsley Corp.     1715   
    Northern Trust Corp     1576   
    Regions Financial Corp     3500   
    Sun Trust Banks     3500   
   US  Bancorp      6599   
   Zions  Bancorporation      1400   
21/11/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate        25062
23/11/2008  US  Citigroup  262000      
09/12/2008  DE  Hypo Real Estate        12937
11/12/2008  FR  BNP Paribas     3389.97    
   Crédit  Agricole      3988.2   
   Societé  Générale      2259.98   
21/12/2008  EI  Allied Irish Banks     2775    
    Bank of Ireland Group     2775   
23/12/2008  US  M&T BankCorp     600    
31/12/2008  US  CIT Group     2330    
   Citigroup      20000   
    Fifth Third Bancorp     3408   
    PNC Financial Services Group     7579.2   
    Sun Trust Banks     1350   
09/01/2009  US  American Express Company     3388.89    
    Bank of America     10000   
14/01/2009  AT  Erste Group Bank        7904.4
16/01/2009  US  Bank of America  97000      
   Citigroup      301000   
20/01/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate        15535.2
11/02/2009  DE  Hypo Real Estate        12893
12/02/2009  EI  Allied IrishBanks     1923.3    
    Bank of Ireland Group     1923.3   
26/02/2009  UK  Royal Bank of Scotland     16593.2    43 
 
27/02/2009  AT  Erste Group Bank     3418.74    
07/03/2009  UK  LloydsTSB     329524    
10/03/2009  IT  Banco Popolare     1849.04    
13/03/2009 US  Discover  Financial Services     1224.558    
18/03/2009  IT  Unicredit Group     2622    
20/03/2009  IT  Intesa Sanpaolo     5426.4    
24/03/2009 IT  Banca  Popolare  di Milano     676.2    
27/03/2009  IT  Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena     2528.14    
31/03/2009  FR  BNP Paribas     6763.11    
13/04/2009  US  Wells Fargo Bank  2873      
17/04/2009  US  Bank of America  798.9      
Total       362671.9 960151.1046  195923.6
 
NOTES: AP = Asset Guarantees and Purchase; CI = Capital Injection; DG = Debt Guarantees. Source: 
















Table 7:  Effects of general and specific announcements on banks’ rates of return; fixed effects 
COEFFICIENT 
.                        All Announcements                       .  .               Announcements by type                   . 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All periods  Subperiod 1  Subperiod 2  Subperiod 3  All periods  Subperiod 1  Subperiod 2  Subperiod 3 
Rm  1.405*** 1.355*** 1.331*** 1.731*** 1.405*** 1.355*** 1.332*** 1.732*** 
SIZE  0.00215*** 0.00324***  0.0198***  0.00217  0.00211*** 0.00324*** 0.0198***  0.00251 
G  0.00666*** -0.00183 0.00465*** 0.00290*         
      GAP       0.00345**  0  0.00455**  -0.0128 
      GCI       0.00481*** -0.00183  0.00216  0.00429** 
      GDG       0.00614*** 0  0.00443  -0.00916 
S  -0.0119*** 0.0179* -0.0136*** 0.00355         
      SAP       -0.0109  0  -0.0243  0.00607 
      SCI       -0.0137*** 0  -0.0156***  0.00308 
      SDG       -0.00103  0.0179*  0.00637  0 
Constant  -0.0202*** -0.0315***  -0.180***  -0.0187  -0.0198*** -0.0315*** -0.180***  -0.0217 
Observations  61,467 34,354 14,697 12,416 61,467 34,354 14,697 12,416 
Number  of  bank  120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Adjusted R
2  0.392 0.428 0.320 0.328 0.392 0.428 0.321 0.328 
F-Test  9,984 6,814 2,544 1,547 4,993 6,814 1,273 885.3 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hausman  Test  36.00 23.61 208.8 47.71 36.81 23.61 284.6  -99.81
(a) 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) 
WALD GSx=0  52.06 1.618 12.72 1.562 18.20 1.618 5.560 1.907 
  (0.000) (0.198) (0.000) (0.210) (0.000) (0.198) (0.000)  (0.0896) 
F-Test GAP=GCI       0.512  -  0.457  2.719 
       (0.474)    (0.499)  (0.0991) 
F-Test GAP=GDG       1.677  -  0.00150  0.0927 
       (0.195)    (0.969)  (0.761) 
F-Test GCI=GDG       0.382  -  0.301  4.237 
       (0.537)    (0.583)  (0.0395) 
F-Test GAP=GCI       0.0959  -  0.222  0.0329 
       (0.757)    (0.638)  (0.856) 
F-Test GAP=GDG       0.856  -  2.134  0.172 
       (0.355)    (0.144)  (0.678) 
F-Test GCI=GDG       3.584  -  3.747  0.163 
       (0.0583)    (0.0529)  (0.687) 
CAR=G*7  4.66% - 3.26%  2.03%        
      CAR=GAP*7       2.42%  -  3.19%  - 
      CAR=GC I *7       3.37%  -  -  3.00% 
      CAR=GDG*7       4.30%  -  -  - 
CAR=S*5  -5.95% 8.95% -6.80%  -         
      CAR=SAP*5       -  -  -  - 
      CAR=SCI*5       -6.85%  -  -7.80%  - 
      CAR=SDG*5       -  8.95%  -  - 
 
NOTES: All estimations with fixed effects. See text for sub-period. Rm = rate of market return; SIZE = ln(Market 
Capitalization in million USD); G = general announcement; S = specific announcement; AP = Asset Guarantees and 
Purchase; CI = Capital Injection; DG = Debt Guarantees; Hausman Test vs. random effect model; GSx = all general 
and specific announcements; CAR = Cumulative Abnormal Return. (a) fails to meet asymptotic assumption.  




Table 8: Effects of cross-area general announcements on banks’ rates of return; fixed effects. 
COEFFICIENT 
.   EUROPE                                                                     . .      PACIFIC     .  .          USA          . 
  .         GBP         .  .          EUR        .   
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2 
Rm  1.183*** 1.425***  1.138***  1.043***  1.608*** 
SIZE  0.0155*** 0.0261***  0.0125***  0.0168***  0.0223*** 
G  -0.00547** -0.0302**  0.00449*  0.00428**  0.0150*** 
S -0.0120**  -0.0188  -0.00522  0  -0.0162*** 
XGUSA  0.00407* -0.00825  0.00339  -0.00198  0 
XGPACIFIC  -0.00369* 0.00297 -0.00496**  0.00703*** -0.00311 
XGEUROPE  -0.00439*** -0.00551  -0.00369**  0.00111  -0.00479** 
Constant  -0.136*** -0.234***  -0.111***  -0.163***  -0.198*** 
Observations 6002  718  4177  3160  5535 
Number of bank  49  6  34  26  45 
Adjusted R
2 0.260  0.0787  0.355  0.477  0.387 
F-Test 410.0  20.97  396.1  931.9  774.2 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hausman Test  59.57  6.944 47.32 36.55  85.17 
 (0.000)  (0.435)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
WALD XGX=0 2.667  0.351  2.813  5.676  3.068 
 (0.0460)  (0.788)  (0.0378)  (0.000700)  (0.0466) 
CAR=G*7  -3.83% -21.14%  3.14%  3.00%  10.50% 
CAR=S*5 -6.00%  -  -  -  -8.10% 
CAR=XGUSA*7  2.85% -  -  -   
CAR=XGPACIFIC*7  -2.58% -  -3.47%  4.92%  - 
CAR=XGEUROPE*7  -3.07% -  -2.58%  -  -3.35% 
 
NOTES: All estimations with fixed effects. Sub-period 2 is from 15 September 2008 to 6 March 2009. Rm = rate of 
market return; SIZE = ln(Market Capitalization in million USD); G  = general announcement; S = specific 
announcement; XGAREA = across AREA general announcement; AP = Asset Guarantees and Purchase; CI = Capital 
Injection;  DG = Debt Guarantees; Hausman Test vs random effect model; XGX = all across-areas general 





Table 9: Effects of cross-bank specific announcements on banks’ rates of return; OLS 
COEFFICIENT 
BANK OF 








(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2 Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2  Sub-period 2
Rm  2.269*** 2.235***  1.760*** 1.846*** 1.499***  1.664*** 2.570*** 
SIZE  0.00483 0.00986  0.0157  0.0176 0.00719 0.00824 -0.00340 
G  0.0153 0.00266 0.00490  0.00187  0.00679  -0.00103 0.0141 
S -0.0601**  -0.0133  -0.0156  0.0537**  -0.0500*  0.00734  -0.0288 
XSBANK OF AMERICA   -0.0719**  -0.00767  -0.0272  -0.0212  -0.00496  -0.0178 
XSCITIGROUP  -0.0223  -0.0259*  -0.0254  0.0162  -0.000504  0.00224 
XSJPMORGAN  -0.0333 0    -0.0246 0  -0.0526**  0 
XSWELLS FARGO  0.0846*** 0.0845**  0.0237    0.00375  0.0505*** -0.00715 
XSGOLDMAN SACHS  0 -0.0333  0  0    0  0 
XSAMERICAN EXPRESS  0.0315 0.0546 0.00607  0.0213 0.0154    0.0418 
XSMORGAN STANLEY  0 0  0 0 0 0   
Constant  -0.0497 -0.0981  -0.179  -0.196 -0.0749 -0.0824 0.0382 
Observations 227  227  227  227  227  227  227 
R
2 0.539  0.435  0.588  0.511  0.579  0.668  0.576 
F-Test 31.84  20.96  38.81  28.45 37.46  54.91 37.00 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
WALD X-ANNBANKS=0 2.673  2.555  1.676  2.689  0.763  2.429  0.348 
 (0.0330  (0.0398)  (0.157)  (0.0321)  (0.550)  (0.0487)  (0.845) 
CAR=G*7  - -  - - - - - 
CAR=S*5 -30.05%  -  -  26.85%  -25.00%  -  -30.05% 
CAR=XSBANK OF AMERICA*5   -35.95% -  -  -  -  - 
CAR=XSCITIGROUP*5  -   -12.95%  -  - - - 
CAR=XSJPMORGAN*5  - -   - -  -26.30%  - 
CAR=XSWELLS FARGO*5  42.30% 42.25%  -    -  25.25% 42.30% 
CAR=XSGOLDMAN SACHS*5  - -  - -   - - 
CAR=XSAMERICAN EXPRESS*5  - -  - - -   - 
CAR=XSMORGAN STANLEY*5  - -  - - - -  
 
NOTES: All estimations are OLS. Sub-period 2 is from 15 September 2008 to 6 March 2009. Rm = rate of market 
return; SIZE = ln(Market Capitalization in million USD); G = general announcement; S = specific announcement; 
Hausman Test vs random effect model; XSBANKS = across BANKS specific announcements; CAR = Cumulative 





Appendix:  List of  banks included in market capitalization  
 
Area  Country Bank Nr.  Bank Name 
Europe 
AT  2  ERSTE GROUP BANK AG, RAIFFEISEN INTL BANK HOLDING 
BE  2  DEXIA SA, KBC GROEP NV 
CH 1  VALIANT  HOLDING  AG-REG 
DE  3  COMMERZBANK AG, DEUTSCHE POSTBANK AG, HYPO REAL ESTATE HOLDING 
DK  3  DANSKE BANK A/S, JYSKE BANK-REG, SYDBANK A/S 
ES 6  BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTA, BANCO DE VALENCIA SA, BANCO 
POPULAR ESPANOL, BANCO SANTANDER SA, BANKINTER SA 
FR  4  BNP PARIBAS, CREDIT AGRICOLE SA, NATIXIS, SOCIETE GENERALE 
GR 5  ALPHA BANK A.E., BANK OF GREECE, EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS, NATIONAL 
BANK OF GREECE, PIRAEUS BANK S.A.  
IE  1  ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC 
IT 8 
BANCA CARIGE SPA, BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI SIENA, BANCA POPOLARE DI 
MILANO, BANCO POPOLARE SCARL, INTESA SANPAOLO, PICCOLO CREDITO 
VALTELLINESE, UBI BANCA SCPA, UNICREDIT SPA 
NO  1  DNB NOR ASA 
PT  3  BANCO BPI SA, BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES, BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO 
SE 4  NORDEA BANK AB, SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA, SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN 
SHS, SWEDBANK AB 
UK 6  BANK OF IRELAND, BARCLAYS PLC, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, LLOYDS BANKING 
GROUP PLC, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, STANDARD CHARTERED PLC 
Pacific 
AU 6 
AUST AND NZ BANKING GROUP, BANK OF QUEENSLAND LTD, BENDIGO AND 
ADELAIDE BANK, COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA, NATIONAL 
AUSTRALIA BANK LTD, WESTPAC BANKING CORP 
HK 8 
BANK OF CHINA LTD, BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS CO, BANK OF EAST ASIA, 
BOC HONG KONG HOLDINGS LTD, CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK, HANG SENG 
BANK LTD, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC, IND & COMM BANK OF CHINA 
JP 12 
BANK OF YOKOHAMA LTD, CHIBA BANK LTD, CHUO MITSUI TRUST HOLDINGS, 
FUKUOKA FINANCIAL GROUP INC., MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP, 
MIZUHO FINANCIAL GROUP INC, MIZUHO TRUST & BANKING CO, RESONA 
HOLDINGS INC, SHINSEI BANK LTD, SHIZUOKA BANK LTD, SUMITOMO MITSUI 
FINANCIAL GROUP, SUMITOMO TRUST & BANKING CO 
USA US  45 
AMERICAN CAPITAL LTD, AMERICAN EXPRESS CO, AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL 
INC, BANK OF AMERICA CORP, BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP, BB&T 
CORP, CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP, CIT GROUP INC, CITIGROUP INC, CMA 
GROUP INC, COMERICA INC, DISCOVERY FINANCIAL SERVICES, E*TRADE 
FINANCIAL CORP, FEDERATED INVESTORS INC, FIFTH THIRD BANCORP, FIRST 
HORIZON NATIONAL CORP, FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC, GOLDMAN SACHS 
GROUP INC, HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC, HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC, 
INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE INC, INVESCO LTD, JANUS CAPITAL GROUP 
INC, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO, KEYCORP, LEGG MASON INC, LEUCADIA 
NATIONAL CORP, M & T BANK CORP, MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP, MOODY'S 
CORP, MORGAN STANLEY, NASDAQ OMX GROUP, NORTHERN TRUST CORP, 
NYSE EURONEXT, PEOPLE'S UNITED FINANCIAL, PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES 
GROUP, REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP, SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP, SLM CORP, 
STATE STREET CORP, SUNTRUST BANKS INC, T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC, US 
BANCORP, WELLS FARGO & CO, ZIONS BANCORPORATION 
NOTES: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; DE=Germany; DK=Denmark; ES=Spain; FR=France; GR=Greece; 
IE=Eire; IT=Italy; NO=Norway; PT=Portugal; SE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom; AU=Australia; HK=Hong-Kong; 
JP=Japan; US=United States. Source: Bloomberg. 
 